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TECHNOETHICS
1. INTRODUCTION




“Only morality in our actions can give beauty
and dignity to life.”
Albert Einstein
In 1765 the Royal Basque Society of the Friends of the Country was
founded by the Count of Peñaflorida. Scientific studies came alive and were
stimulated during the Enlightenment by this Society. The first article of the
Society’s baylaws states that the purpose of the organization is “to cultivate
the inclination and the tastes of the Basque Nation toward the Sciences,
Letters and Arts”. I think this Society may serve as a timely example of the
way we ought to conduct our scientific research in the future.
This work tries to bridge the gap between the so-called “two cultures”
—the sciences and the humanities —in the spirit of the above mentioned
enlightened Society in order to deal with the ethical problems raised by
modern technological applications and implementations (1).
2. MORAL, CODES
There are no moral codes other than those of mankind. Only our com-
plex intelligence has been able to elaborate norms of conduct. Ethics refers to
desirable social behavior. Ethics is not a science. Nevertheless, to know what
(1) These problems vary from the development of nuclear energy for peace or war to
genetic engineering to control of people’s behavior. (See Goodpaster and Sayre 1979 for a sample
of the main ethical problems of the 21st century. On environmental ethics and duties to future
generations and to nonhuman beings from a technological point of view see Barbour 1980 Ch. 4).
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is good or bad for mankind, we do need scientific studies, from biology to
anthropology to psychology to sociology to politology to economics to history.
Ethics can use the findings of these particular sciences.
Here I adopt a humanistic and scientific approach to ethics. Humanistic in
line with the Canadian poet F. R. Scott’s creed: “The world is my country /
the human is my race / The spirit of man is my god / the future of man is my
heaven”. Scientific in the sense that science aims to produce maximally true
conceptual models of reality, hence of mankind himself.
Although it is admitted that norms of social behavior are necessary
(otherwise life would be chaos), trouble arises when characterizing what good
or evil is, or what moral or immoral means, when valuating things, processes,
actions, or anything else. What is good for one person may be indifferent or
even evil for another. Further, what is good for a person in some circumstan-
ces and at a given time, may be not so good, indifferent or even bad for that
same person in other (political, cultural, social) circumstances, or at some
other period of time. I.e., values are not only person-dependent but also
circumstance-and time-dependent.
The analysis of an absolute morality, whether negative (Epicurean or
Popperian) or positive (following Kant’s categorical imperative) goes beyond
the scope of this work. I shall criticize them only tangentially, for in my view,
since ethics refers to what “ought to be” and not to what “is”, the “Thou
shalt not do A” of a negative (and authoritarian) ethic should give way to a
positive and persuasive ethic where values, ends and means ought to be
justified in the light of the best and deepest scientific knowledge at hand. If
this is so, it is clear that ethics are relative to particular individuals (through
their levels of knowledge) and to specific circumstances.
Moral norms are then relative and culturally bounded (2). The fact that
moral norms are relative does not mean that they are unnecessary. On the
contrary, the goals are set by mankind in a clear response to a given social and
physical environment. Therefore, the study of the environmental constraints
—natural and social (political, cultural, economic and military) — as well as the
study of mankind himself — his wants and needs — are imperative before an
action, and in particular a technological action, may be judged as good,
indifferent, or evil.
Ethical norms as such may be treated as a specific field of our general
approach to norms outlined elsewhere (Tobar-Arbulu 1985a). I.e., we can
reformulate the moral imperatives as propositions proper, as conclusions of
(2) There is no culture without values. From the Basques of both sides of the Pyrenees to
the Mohawk indians of the United States and Canada, people behave according to some system of
values. The problem is how to identify the major values of any human community and how to
quantify them. This brings us to empirical studies of value systems.
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law-statements and value jugments. This way we cross the value/fact distinc-
tion. (Law statement; If means M is implemented then goal G is attainable
with a certain probability p. Value judgment: Goal G is good (valuable and
desirable) for some people in some given circumstances. Therefore, M ought
to be implemented).
Conceiving ethics as a branch of technology, we also cross the barrier
between Sir Snow’s “two cultures”. Indeed, there is a place where the two
cultures meet, i.e., modern technology. This way we may continue to cherish
science, which “ennobles anyone who is engaged in it, whether scholar or
merely student” (Einstein, quoted in Press 1980 p. 512) and whose “intellec-
tual depth, complexity and articulation (is) the most beautiful and wonderful
collective work of the mind of man” (Snow 1969 p. 14)). While we distinguish
some intrinsic values (such as knowledge, peace, freedom, love and justice)
from instrumental ones, we do not draw a clear line between the two. Indeed,
intrinsic values such as peace, freedom and justice can be the keys to happi-
ness, just as science (the knowledge we cherish the most) is the foundation of
modern technology. We therefore do not espouse an absolute morality (given
by whom, anyhow?). We care about the different moral codes (explicit or not)
according to which we, human beings, behave.
I claim that explicit moral codes should contribute to the guidance of
actions, especially in the realm of technology where we take decisions having
to do with issues affecting other persons (present and future) and the environment.
Here is a list of some open ethical problems raised by modern technology:
I Who has the right to the use of natural resources?
II Who is responsible for preserving the environment?
III Will some unborn generations not have the resources they will
probably need in order to live?
IV On what basis can we justify the preserving of animals of endange-
red species while people are starving all over the world?
V Is it morally proper that a few individuals or nations should live in
great comfort while others are starving and dying?
VI How should we approach decisions having to do with certain broad
types of issues affecting other persons, other conscious sentient
beings, and the environment?
VII How can public policy be related to human rights, environmental
protection — water, air, natural beauty, energy use and natural
resources?
The clarification of these, or similar problems (see a broad view of moral
problems in Goodpaster and Sayre 1979) is not intended as an appeal to stop
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the technological progress and development, but as a call to understand it
better and to use it wisely. Not only the scientist and the technologist should
be exposed to this problématique but also the layman, in order that reason be
separated from hysteria in the popular press: I.e., to recognize the fact that
technology can lead, though not deterministically, to evil, destroying or poiso-
ning the world. Otherwise, “Justification of a technical arrogance toward
nature on the basis of dividends and profits is not just bad economics — it is
basically an immoral act” (Means 1967 p. 12).
2. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL VALUES
Science tells technology what can be done (and what cannot), but not
what should be done. Science tells us what the world is like, and technology
what we can do in it, but neither gives sufficient guidance for life. The driving
force of technology is the design of artifacts, from machines to social plans.
The task of designing a desired artifact from given components and resources,
and respecting given constraints is a problem of synthesis. Synthesis can be
conceptual or factual. The technologist performs conceptual synthesis of forms
(architecture), circuits (electrical engineering), molecules (chemical enginee-
ring) or social systems (social engineering). In this sense the task of the
technologist is the mirror image of that of the scientist, who analyzes systems
into components and structures. The technologist uses such analysis. Analysis
is for him a means to an end: it is a means for synthesis.
Technology is an end for the technologist and should be a means for
everybody else; it is a means for developing or maintaining the economy,
which in turn is, or should be, at the service of society at large. But techno-
logy by itself is not the whole of development; in particular, technology by
itself cannot fill the gap between the rich and the poor countries. In develo-
ping countries, “The principal limits to sustained economic growth and accele-
rated development are political, social and institutional in character rather than
physical. (...) Investment resources coming from abroad would be important
but are secondary as compared to internal sources” (Leontief et al. 1977
p. 11). Therefore, it is a mistake to adopt new technologies just because they
are more advanced, in particular because they save on labor. Development is a
more complex issue than the implementation of advanced (or soft) technolo-
gies for the sake of saving labor. The level of technological innovation should
be adjusted to the level of employment within the framework of the specific
development process of the society in question, not the other way around.
Further, while the goal of the scientist is the search for truth by itself, that
of the technologist is utilitarian, for he is a pragmatist (Tobar-Arbulu 1985b) (3).
(3) This pragmatic aspect of technologists must not be confused with pragmatism, which
maintains that the sole criterion for truth is practice, witness Marxism. (See more on the
pragmatic aspects of the technologist in Tobar-Arbulu 1985b.)
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As for the ethos of technology it is the same as that of science, i.e., the
search for truth, the correction of error, the justification of belief and a
concern for testing. It does, however, display some differences: 1. for techno-
logy utility is the maximal value, and truth has only an instrumental value;
and 2. scientific research is open to public scrutiny, whereas technology is
often secret (both in the civil and in the military enterprises) and protected by
patents.
In science we praise exactness, maximal truth, logical consistency and
testability. In technology we take into account exactness, truth (not necessarily
maximal), logical consistency, testability, efficiency, safety, reliability, practical
applicability, plus the moral code concerning the use of human and natural
resources (Tobar-Arbulu 1985c, d).
This is essential, especially if we keep in mind the fact that technological
knowledge can be used for good or for evil: to create wants instead of
satisfying needs, and to build weapons (nuclear or not) for mass murder.
Moreover, any technological innovation is bound to be risky. It may be
culturally, politically, socially, economically or biologically harmful to society.
Therefore, analyses of risk situations, evaluations of risks, designs of safety
systems, information to the public and public participation in deciding accepta-
ble risks (4) are part and parcel of technology-guided actions as we attempted
to show elsewhere (Tobar-Arbulu 1986). (On ‘acceptable risk’ see Fischchoff et
al. 1981, Lowrance 1976, Otway 1976).
Since technology can be used both for welfare and warfare, any technolo-
gical innovation and its implementation should make explicit the code of values
upon which it is based so that the citizen can have a clear reference when
valueing and judging social plans and programs of action. In my view, when
an action, in particular a technological action, has or brings with it a moral
element, this should be included or taken into consideration for valuation
reasons. (In fact, when defining technology as a field of knowledge oriented
toward action, the codes by which technologists are guided have been inclu-
ded (Tobar-Arbulu 1985c, d), so that the technologist himself brings his
system of values into the open).
This system of values of the technologist requires a rational justification,
which is better if it is scientific and has been elaborated through the different
social sciences. Although both science and technology have their own codes
of norms, these are not enough to guide everyday behavior. The system of
values, as such, is given neither by science nor by technology. It is part of the
ideology of the individual. Ideology determines the systems of values and
(4) Risk analyses should go beyond all that is observed in current risk-analytic procedures
—the ratio of expected utility (benefit) to the concomitant disutility, which has been taken into
account (risk)—, i.e., beyond the so-called ‘risk-benefit ratio’. See Kunreuther and Ley (1982) on
present-day risk analysis controversy.
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goals concerning what a good society is and what good social behavior is, by
decreeing what is worth doing and what must be avoided (5).
Although different social groups have different moral codes within the
communities of technologists, all these partial codes ought to share a minimal
moral code, a kind of universal morality to be gathered in a comprehensive
oath of the technologist, similar to the Hippocratic oath. Such a code would
be but a special application to technological research of the kind of humanistic
and scientific ethics proposed above. (More on this Hippocratic code in
Section 3.2.)
3. RESPONSIBILITY
Our approach to society is not an atomistic one, i.e., one where society is
the sum of every and each of its individual components. On the contrary, we
see society as a composite of individuals who have relationships both among
themshelves and with the external environment. There are no individual
humans in a vacuum.
We have dealt elsewhere with development and human needs (Tobar-
Arbulu 1985e). Needs have been characterized within a general framework.
This general framework must be specified to the particular (social, political,
economic and cultural) conditions of the group or society under study. Furt-
her, I submit that there are group needs, as there are individual needs.
Witness the United Nations resolutions on People’s Rights. Despite naive
economic analysis, the will to national independence, if not “the most power-
ful force in our time” (Galbraith 1983a p. 36), is a real social force. Therefore,
we should elucidate the notion of “individual responsibility” and “group or
social responsibility” (6).
Responsibility implies knowledge. A responsible human being is one who
performs an action on the following bases: 1. the knowledge that the action
is likely to bring about the desired outcome; 2. the knowledge that this
(5) No one can be free from ideology. The key is to elaborate a kind of ideology in tune
whit both the deepest possible knowledge, i.e., the natural and social sciences, and the genuine
and realistic aspirations of the greatest number of people. Thus elsewhere (Tobar-Arbulu 1985e) it
has been suggested a basis for the ordering of values in a hierarchy of human needs: 1. survival
(physiological needs): food, shelter, health; 2. security (safety needs): protection from danger and
threat; 3. belonging (social needs): friendship, acceptance, love; 4. self-esteem (ego needs):
self-respect, recognition, status; 5. self-actuation (fulfillment needs): creativity, realization of
individual potentialities. (See also Galtung 1980, ILO 1977, Mailman 1980 on aspirations, wants,
and basic needs.)
(6) One must neither attribute properties of persons to groups, nor deny that these have
properties some of which are shared by their members (i.e., group interests, group values) and
others which are not (i.e., private interest).
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outcome does not violate any of the norms of social behavior adopted by the
group to which the performer belongs; and 3. freedom, for he who acts
compulsorily (by force of the circumstances) does not act responsibly.
In our view, whoever is in charge of an event or process whose outcome
is beneficial (or harmful) to others, is responsible for that outcome.
Remarks
1. A “group action” is the action performed b y all members of a set of
individuals.
2. Responsibility is individual not collective (7).
3. He who has the control of the occurrence of the event is responsible.
4. There are degrees of responsibility: the one who has the ultimate
control (7) is more responsible.
When dealing with responsibility we should ask then the following questions:
1 . who makes the decision?; 2. who chooses the course of action?; 3.
who performs the action?
In our struggle to deepen science and to improve technology, there is
room for decision-makers, scientists, technologists, technicians, laymen and
computers, but at different levels and with different tasks and responsibilities.
These responsibilities should be undertaken consciously. As Born (1971 p. 233)
stated: “Even if one does not earn one’s living by science, but (nonetheless)
publishes the results of one’s research, one cannot rid oneself of the responsi-
bilities for the use which is made of them. I have stuck to this point of view
right up to the present”. (See more on Einstein’s “plumber question” in
Tobar-Arbulu 1984a.)
As for computers, it is true that computers do make decision at certain
levels. However, since a computer indulges in no spontaneous activity, such
decisions are computer-aided decisions made by the computer-programmer
system. Therefore a computer is not responsible for any decision made by it.
Further, computers do not decide what our basic goals and values (and
uriorities) are. These goals and values, such as the promotion of human life
(7) The German pilots who, in 1937 bombed the little Basque town of Guernica (that
Picasso immortalized) had control over their planes, although they were obeying orders from their
commanders. They were as responsible as was Franco for all they destroyed (“Guernica was not
bombed by my air force... it was destroyed with fire and gasoline by the Basques themselves”,
Thomas and Morgan 1975, p. 12) and Hitler (“An international investigation of Guernica is to be
rejected under all circumstances” , op. cit. p. 12). (See Galbraith (1967-78, p. 62) on “accorded
responsibility” in modern economic corporations.)
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and happiness, decrease in suffering and search for truth and understanding,
provide us with the ultimate norms for directing and judging actions and
decision-making. Such computer-aided decisions are not free decisions (Tobar-
Arbulu 1984b). Computers are not legally or morally responsible for their
“decisions”. Responsibility rests upon the user or the programmer.
As for the responsibility for external costs (such as pollution and the
hazards of work, consumption, and the general environment), this is still very
much at issue in the public arena, and business is fighting strenuously to
prevent the internalization of these costs that are being pressed upon it
(Herman 1981 p. 263). The costs involved are potentially enormous and




On August 6, 1985, the 40th anniversary of the destruction of Hiroshima
was commemorated. Such a technologically and politically monstrous act is
considered by some people as the “logical” consequence of Einstein’s work.
Indeed, in November 1905 Einstein published three pages in Annalen der
Physik. Using electromagnetic equations taken from a previous work of his on
relativity (Einstein 1905a), he showed that “if a body gives an amount E
(actually, he wrote L) of energy in the form of radiation, its mass dismisses by
an amount E/c
2
, thas is, “The mass of the body is a measure of its energy
content” (Einstein 1905b).
Although there has been some misunderstanding related to the develop-
ment of Einstein’s famous and popular formula, the mass-energy equivalence
relation “E=mc
2
”, is but a necessary, consequence of the following four
premises: 1. the principle of relativity; 2. the law of conservation of energy;
3. the relativistic equation of the motion of a particle; and 4. the relativistic
law of transformation of the energy of an electromagnetic wave.
Taking into account such premises ant the fact that the principle of
relativity (Einstein 1905a), in turn, implies that a) the laws of physics take the
same form in all inertial frames, and b) in any given inertial frame, the
velocity of light c is the same whether the light be emitted by a body at rest or
(8) “The drive to preserve and expand profits remains to be reinforced by competitive
pressures. Because environmental controls vary in different parts of the United States, as well as
between domestic and foreign producers, they not only add the burden of higher costs, but they
also threaten competitive disadvantage. This adds to the intensity of resistance to environmental
controls and readiness to move production facilities to superior investment climates” (Hetman
1981, p. 263-264). For an important illustration on the export of hazardous enterprises see
Castleman 1978.
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by a body in uniform motion, Einstein came out with the equivalence relation
between mass at rest and energy.
This equation was not verified quantitatively until some twenty-five years
later. If it is added the fact that the Hungarian Szilard proposed, in 1934, the
idea of a “chain reaction”, it is clear that Einstein could not foresee the tragic
events that would arise out of this E = mc
2
.
Einstein, however, was aware of the uses, misuses, and abuses of techno-
logy. In fact, in 1931, at the California Institute of Technology Einstein
(Nathan and Norden 1960, p. 122) stated: “...If you want your life’s work to be
useful to mankind, it is not enough that you understand applied science as
such. Concern for man himself must always constitute the chief objetive of all
technological effort, concern for the big, unsolved problems of how to organi-
ze human work and the distribution of commodities in such a manner as to
assure that the results of our scientific thinking may be a blessing to mankind,
and not a curse.
“Never forget this when you are pondering over your diagrams and
equations!”
As for the responsibility of the use of basic science for technological
purposes, and in particular for the use of the mass-energy equivalence relation
in the development of nuclear weapons, Einstein (Nathan and Norden 1960,
p. 569) replied, in 1952, to a Hungarian survivor of the concentration camp of
Dachau: “You are mistaken in regarding me as a kind of chieftain of those
scientists who abuse science for military purposes. I have never worked in the
field of applied science, let alone for the military.
“I condemn the military mentality of our times as you do (...).
“My name is linked to the atomic bomb in two different ways. Almost
fifty years ago I discovered the equivalence of mass and energy, a relationship
which served as the guiding principle in the work leading to the release of
atomic energy. Secondly, I signed a letter to President Roosevelt, stressing the
need for work in the field of the atomic bomb. I felt this was necessary
because of the dreadful danger that the Nazi regime might be the first to
come into possession of the atomic bomb.”
This signature was, however, considered by Einstein himself as a “great
mistake” (Tobar-Arbulu 1984a).
As for the relation between basic science and technology; when Professor
Jules Isaac (Nathan and Northen 1960, p. 622) asked Einstein whether he
should not have had the foresight to predict the possible dangerous technolo-
gical “consequences of his equations” when he first published the Theory of
Relativity in 1905, Einstein (Nathan and Norden 1960, p. 623) answered as
follows: “Now you seem to believe that I, poor fellow that I am, by discove-
ring and publishing the relationship between mass and energy, made an
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important contribution to the lamentable situation in which we find ourselves
today. You suggest that I should then, in 1905, have foressen the possible
development of atomic bombs. But this was quite impossible since the accom-
plishment of a “chain reaction” was dependent on the existence of empirical
data that could hardly have been anticipated in 1905. But even if such
knowledge had been available, it would have been ridiculous to attempt to
conceal the particular conclusion resulting from the Special Theory of Relati-
vity. Once the theory existed, the conclusion also existed and could not have
remained concealed for any length of time. As for the theory itself, it owes its
existence to the efforts to discover the properties of the “lumiferous ether”!
There was never even the slightest indication of any potential technological
application.”
What in Einstein’s later years was the tip of the iceber of ethical concern,
is today one of the main issues in scientific and technological research.
Nowadays, some professional societies of scientists and technologists have
become notably involved in questions of ethics and human values: the access
to science of previously disadvantaged groups (see Salam 1984), the rights of
scientists to object to unethical practices, the desperate need for arms control,
the human rights of colleagues in totalitarian regimes, the sharing of scientific
and technological resources with Third World countries, and so on.
Basic science is a good in itself (9), although it can be used instrumentally
through technology. Technology itself, and not just its owners —be they
entrepreneurs, politicians or military men— may be good or evil.
When applying technological knowledge we face two kinds of situation: a)
we may encounter unexpected evil (this is why in risky situations we deal with
safety systems); b) we may encounter expected evil. The technology of expec-
ted evil (from mass manipulation to the desing of concentration camps) is
itself evil. Most of the time, however, a technology-guided action will produce
good and bad effects at the same time. This is why we have to evaluate both
(Tobar-Arbulu 1985a) and subject the application of technological knowledge
to social and moral controls.
3.2. Moral codes in technology
Professionals have a very special social contract. Society expects them to
serve it by serving their clients. Society in exchange gives them license to
(9) For pure science as the core of culture see Rabi (1970). A modern concept of develop-
ment implies the appropriation of science and technology: “Genuine appropriation of science and
technology is both a basic prerequisite for any progress towards growth, and an integral part of the
multi-dimensional development process, linked, through a complex network of interactions, with
the other components of that process (economic, political, social and cultural, and involving
institutions as much as practice)” (UNESCO 1979, p. 12).
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practice. Regarding morality, the clients’ morality may differ greatly from that
of the majority of society. (So much so, since we support a pluralistic approach
to ethics, if only because different social groups may have different systems of
values. To this fact, the professionals’ own morality must be added.) Therefo-
re, the professional is placed in a conflicting situation: a) either he sacrifices
the interest of his client(s) in favor of those of society; b) or he sacrifices the
interests of society in favor of those of his client(s).
Diverting interest among technologists, among clients, among societies
and nations, poses the same sort of conflict but at a different, and usually
more complex level. Such conflicts are too alive to exemplify here. Consensus
and negotiation is mandatory in such cases.
Since the professional is regarded as the person who knows, society, i.e.,
the citizens, should know and understand what it may expect from him as
bases for professional decisions. It is his professional duty to made public his
principles, even more if we take into consideration the fact that professional
communities are usually legislated by moral codes of behavior. Green (1967)
has raised the question: Can our legal system impose effective social control
over new technologies before they inflict substantial injuries upon society?
The trouble is that pending legislation to establish a technological assessment
board such as Green proposes is not longer a possible solution for there are
“experts” on both sides of the fence —not to mention experts with different
world views and value systems— in practically all of the major ethical problems
in modern technology. Indeed, it is not rare to encounter a situation wherein
the interests of two social groups are at odds, while both groups have techni-
cal experts to support their opposing views: examples are the debates on the
so-called “nuclear winter” ,on nuclear weapons, on bio-genetical engineering,
on nuclear waste and so on. Therefore, the old prescription —when experts
disagree, suspend judgment— is no longer of much use.
Consensus is the issue in question, apart from the elucidation of what
“public interest” is. (Incidentally, one of the tasks of the “Technology Assess-
ment” agencies would be precisely to debote themselves to this important
social issue, i.e., the elucidation of the notion of “public interest”.) Further
advances in the social sciences (from antropology to sociology to economics to
politology to law and history) are needed in order to provide the foundations
for a definition of the “public interest” and “quality of life” beyond the
notions of the utilitarians on general welfare (Susskind 1973 p. 129-131).).
In orden to reach consensus, I claim that technologists, both at the
individual and at the social level, must bring their value systems into the
open —what value they place on human life, what importance they recognize
in the well-being of members of other nations. The question is even more
critical if we take into consideration that legislation is a public affair and that
different moral codes are usually legislated, for it is society’s privilege and duty
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to use its best human resources to judge the adequacy of these preferences
and to negotiate with professional communities. It is in this framework that
moral codes may be discussed, negotiated and eventually legislated. This
approach is independent from the particular social concern of each individual
technologist. However, I also claim that one important aspect of a technolo-
gist’s education is to become aware of the character and needs of the society
in which he will live and develop his skills.
We are, therefore, in need of new moral codes for the different branches
of technology. Technological processes ought to be guided by new axiological
or moral maxims, among which are the following:
I Man and nature are not at odds. Both are valuable, although in
different degress. (Therefore, man is responsible not only to nature
but also to future generations of human beings.)
II The task of technology is not the exploitation of nature and human
resource s per se, or for the sake of increasing the GNP. Social,
political, cultural, environmental and moral considerations must be
taken into account as well as economic analyses.
III Technologits, are morally responsible. Moral issues do not concern
only the technologists’ bosses —entrepreneurs, politicians and military
men.
These axiological maxims have to be justified. Indeed, we have tried to
show some desiderata (through the basis needs approach in Tobar-Arbulu
1985e) based upon scientific knowledge of nature, human beings and society.
Further, the notion of global development has been related to this basic needs
approach (Tobar-Arbulu 1985e) as a dynamic process. This process, as a
means of continuously (and endlessly) improving the quality of life of citizens
is the framework against which any technological moral code has to be
contrasted. What helps and improves global development is socially “good”
and what stops, blocks or kills development is socially “evil”.
Since, in my view, the basis needs approach is a sort of universal frame-
work (Tobar-Arbulu 1985e), I am in favor of enforcing a kind of universal
moral code for technologists, something similar to Susskind’s “An Engineer’s
Hippocratic Oath” (1973 p. 118) but expanded to all the differente branches of
technology, so that evil components and negative side-effects at the individual
and social levels may be minimized. This kind of universal moral code must
be, of course, a general framework given the width of the different branches of
technology, and taking into account the different value systems of each and
every technologist. However, the minimun core shared by technologists should
be the explicit lyrics of this “The Technologist’s Hippocratic Oath”. (See
Baron 1984, Curd and May 1984, Flores and Baum 1980, Martin and Schinzin-
ger 1983, Schaub and Paulovic 1983, Unger 1982, Weil 1983, where the
personal responsibility of engineers in their professional work is discussed.)
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Both the general Hippocratic Oath of the technologist (see Appendix) and
the specific moral code for the particular technology should be implemented
with continuous (and never-ending) studies on human needs so that social
desiderata can be clearly defined, evaluated, and chosen through the democra-
tic participation of all the people likely to be affected by the implementation of
any technology. The imposition of restrictions on any technological process in
view of the desiderata and goals, its outcome and side-effects belongs, therefo-
re, to the citizens.
In my view, the task of technologists goes beyond “whistleblowing” (10)
(Weil 1983) to a more responsible position in a broader and more modern
conception of technology. In fact, it behooves “Technology Assessment” to
assume the task of evaluating different projects before, during and after
implementation (Tobar-Arbulu 1985f). Further, it behooves citizens to claim
their right and duty to decide the kind of development, i.e. of society and
quality of life, that they are willing to live with, and to light for. Technology,
then, can be good or bad according to the practical ends it serves. Technolo-
gists as bearers of technological knowledge have a special social and moral
duty to society. In particular they have the duty to control —through design-
the outputs of technological implementations so as to minimize any evil
side-effects. On the other hand, it is the citizens who should demand legisla-
tion aimed not only at public and private corporations (so that social interests
may be preserved) but also at technologists’ societies with respect to their
public professional work.
Since responsibility is personal, every technologist is responsible for what
he does or recommends should be done. The technologist is, therefore,
responsible to: 1. his employer; 2. his peers, i.e., his own profession; 3. his
society. As pointed out by different authors (Goodpaster and Sayre 1979,
Barbour 1980), the technologist, like any other human being involved in
performing some action, is also responsible to: a) mankind in general, i.e., his
contemporaries; and b) the generations to come (DeGeorge 1979).
Therefore, the technologist when designing any technological project should
keep in mind all the people who may be affected by it, the living and those
yet to be born.
4. PLANNING AND FREEDOM
Planning consists of a) designing a desirable future, and b) inventing ways
of bringing it, or some close approximation of it about. It must be: 1. techno-
(10) Technologists who “blow the whistle” on their employers are vulnerable to retaliation.
Professional societies should provide legal assistance to members who have been fired or transfe-
rred for speaking out in the public interest.
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logically feasible; and 2. participatory, for participation tends to generate
consensus on what the system should be, stimulating creativity.
In order to convert the apparently impossible into the possible it is
necessary to remove or relax constraints. These are imposed both from within
and from without. “The critical constraints are seldom economic, environmen-
tal, or technological. They are usually social, moral, political” (Ackoff 1977
p. 53).
What is interesting about actions is not only the valuation of their
outcomes and the efficiency of the means, but also the weight of their
unintended consequences. Since a) there are no known laws of history, pace
Marx, b) we fight for an open society, and c) any social action is bound to
have side-effects that can be harmful for some people, planning can make the
future possible, i.e. men —not Platonic forces or gods— can make their own
histories.
Freedom, on the other hand, requires opportunities for choice. It is not
freedom from constraints, but freedom to choose among genuine alternatives
—i.e., choices not disvaluable—, which requires a range of real options and the
power to act to further the alternative chosen.
Remarks
1. The above requirement for freedom is a necessary condition not a
sufficient one. In fact, the actual choices may be penalized.
2. Even in the absence of external constraints, unequal power results in
unequal opportunities to choose.
3. We, humans, are born with certain propensities that can be activated
(or inhibited) by natural and social environmental inputs (or lack of
them). Therefore, our behavior is conditioned —though not determi-
ned— by our genetic inheritance and the particular society in which it
is allowed to develop. We are, therefore, free within certain bounds.
4. Freedom is not inborn, but acquired. It must be learned and fought
for.
5 . Responsibility (recall Section 3) requires not only the knowledge that
an undertaken action is likely to bring about the desired outcome
without violating any norm of social or group behavior, but also
freedom.
People vary widely in their awareness of alternatives, their personal initia-
tive and their ability to make deliberate choices. In dealing with public policy,
we are concerned not only with internal but also with external conditions and
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in particular with the social structures and social constraints within which
people can have some control over their own future. Freedom should, there-
fore, be understood as free participation in the political, cultural, economic,
technological and social decisions that affect our lives.
I claim that freedom can and must be planned. Freedom is the result of a
designing triad consisting of 1. the planner’s assumptions, 2. the planning
system’s conditions and 3. the opportunities and/or barriers which enhance
or hinder the exercise of freedom.
As for the planner’s assumptions, they shape the world view or way in
which the planner views the system. Thus a plan is the result of a planner’s
interpretation of a set of data, which in turn depends on the planner’s value
system or assumptions about the outer world, leading to some predictions
about the configuration of the plan.
As for the conditions prevailing in the planning system, they can be











rationality, which describes the role of reason in the planning
system;
equity, which describes how privileges and expertise are distributed
among members;
experts, whose influence is the direct result of whether equity or
inequity prevails in the system;
participation, which establishes the extent to which individual mem-
bers can meaningfully contribute to the. system’s welfare;
change, which states the attitudes, toward the preservation of insti-
tutions which are embedded in the planner’s value system;
control, which belongs to all the people, to experts, or to certain
factions depending on the degree to which participation and equa-
lity are regarded as a basis of the system’s allocative mechanism;
responsiveness, which shows how the system is influenced by the
needs and demands of its members;
conflict, which describes the way in which disputes are settled and
how divergent opinions are taken into account;
technology, which describes the “state of the art”, i.e., the particular
form of tools, instruments, methodologies, advancements and capa-
bilities through which it is organized;
morality, which explains where the “ultimate goal” and the interests
of the individual citizen lie relative to those of the entire society (11);
(11) The nature of the “ultimate goal” depends on the value placed on the welfare of the
“private man”, the interests of society and the power of special groups.
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XI the optimum, which is the value of the system’s objetive function.
(In order to reach the optimum the system should rely on a completely
decentralized adjustment process where all subsystems make individual deci-
sions contributing to the welfare of the total system.)
As for the opportunities and barriers, they flow directly from the two
other elements of the triad, i.e., planner’s assumptions and the conditions
existing in each system.
So, in my view there is no contradiction between planning and freedom.
More planning does not necessarily lead to less freedom. Rather, different
kinds of planning spell different kinds of freedom. Further, better and more
realistic planning can lead to more freedom. Knowledge, thereforme, and in
particular the most genuine kind of knowledge —i.e., science— is the key to
attaining freedom. We need to know ourselves and our environment in order
to make freer decisions.
5. QUALITY OF LIFE
Quality of life is the joint product of development and the resources
available (Tobar-Arbulu 1985e). “Quality of life” calls for defining one’s own
‘quality of life’, for planning one’s own approach to the problem through
learning and participation.
Speculation about ends brings us to ethics, since ethics has been largely
concerned with a search for the “Ultimate Goal” —that is, a criterion that can
be used for ethical evaluation of each act by any entity (individual or group)
that can display a choice. Purposeful ethics attempts to define the “Ultimate
Goal” in terms of wants and consequences. In doing so, ethics can be reduced
to a special branch of technology (Ackoff and Emery 1972 p. 239, Tobar-
Arbulu 1985a).
One attempt to overcome conflict within or between individuals consists
of defining the “Ultimate Goal” in terms of what a community (or a majority
of its members) wants. This leaves us with the difficulty of defining ‘the
greatest good for the greatest number’ (Churchman 1961 Ch. 2).
The social objetive of utilitarians is to maximize the sum of the measura-
ble utilities of all individuals in a given society. The utilitarian ethic has a
pragmatic character: if the utility gain of an action exceeds the utility loss
across society, the action is “right”. If the utility gain is less than the utility
loss across society, the action is “wrong”.
5.1. Utilitarians on the quality of life
What the utilitarians called the ‘greatest happiness of the greatest number’
presents some problems. To begin with, how do we define the degree of
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“happiness”? Second, though in utilitarian theory happiness and utility coinci-
de, in general they do not: not all individuals try systematically to make those
decisions or prefer those states which they believe would maximize their own
happiness; further, an individual cannot always predict his happiness in future
states. Third, for some utilitarians, utility is a linear function of the expected
effects of decisions on the happiness of sentient beings; felicity is taken to be
  a scalar measure of happiness in the same way that utility measures subjetive
preference. Thus Edgeworth (1967) argues that the rich have more sensitivity
and can better enjoy money than the poor. Obviously, then, depending on
beliefs about measurable utility functions, any distribution of income can be
“justified”, ranging from a relatively egalitarian viewpoint to a relatively elitist
viewpoint.
Related to this vast problématique is the rise of the “social indicators”
movement (Bauer 1967). Its literature is filled with references to social indica-
tors, partial system models, which try to bring economic, political, cultural and
social variables together into a general systems theory.
Here are some of the open methodological problems in the “social
indicators” movement:
I what is a social indicator?
II what kinds of variable does it relate?
III how does it relate the different variables?
As Lilienfeld (1978 p. 120) points out, “social indicators are simply old-
fashioned statistics in a new dress (...) whose virtues as well as limitations, are
well known”. These “objetive measures” of the public good are relative,
value-laden, culturally defined, and subjectively conceptualized and are there-
fore simply unattainable. This being the case, what may pass for and be
accepted as social indicators may be so prejudiced, so biased, and so contrived
as to be downright dangerous (Hoos 1982 p. 79). Further, the usefulness and
appropriateness of an index depends on how well it correlates with the
measure for which it is a substitute.
5.2. Ideals of mankind and quality of life
Clearly science and technology have worked miracles, despite some ugly
side-effects. It is natural to ask whether all their effects have been favorable,
and whether they increase our happiness and the quality of life. Science and
technology have surely had one wonderful effect in this regard: the acquisition
of knowledge is both elevating and elating. It is satisfying to work for it, and
the success of such work brightens the lives of many people. But is our
society now on the average happier than it was 100 years ago? For some
1098 JOSE FELIX TOBAR ARBULU
people this is questionable, even more so if we consider the so-called Third
World countries, or some of the traditional cultures in the so-called developed
countries. Are the Mohawk people happier nowaddays than they were 100
years ago? Are the unemployed really happy people? Is the worker happy in
his boring routine job?
I am an engineer, a technologist. I learned about the good sides of
technology. I am proud of belonging to this profession. But the purpose of
technology should change to some qualitative degree. We as technologists
should ask ourselves what the future applications of technological knowledge
are. What should we strive for in general? We should try to avoid suffering all
over the world —starting at home (12)— through the production of goods and
services. We should try to help people to organize themselves-giving recom-
mendations and putting our skills and knowledge at their service, by not
commanding them —in the pursuit of their own goals, for they themselves are
the only judges of the quality of their lives. Moreover, we should try to
develop technological knowledge itself, using deeper scientific theories and
applying the so-called scientific method more realistically to new and more
complex social systems. In particular, we should strive for a technology that
includes human, social and environmental values as well as technical feasibi-
lity, efficiency and economic profitability. We should put more emphasis on
technologies aimed at fulfilling human needs, on technologies that provide
employment and job satisfaction, and that are ecologically sound and subject
to the democratic control and participatory decision-making of all the citizens
likely to be affected by such technologies.
At present, we cannot, or I cannot define “happiness”. It is clear that
happiness does not mean having everything provided. This is a necessary
condition not a sufficient one. Man wants to do something he feels to be
worthwhile. Thus, the researcher’s objective is not so much to solve problems
as it is to create more challenging and important ones. Therefore, the conti-
nuous pursuit of more desirable ends is an end in itself, and hence attainment
of a specific end can be conceptualized as a means to such pursuit.
The quality of life has been related to the pursuit of the ancient triad of
ideals —the “true”, the “good”, and the “beautiful” —to which some authors
(Ackoff and Emery 1972 Ch. 14) have added the pursuit of the “plenty”. I
cannot agree with Ackoff and Emery (1982 p. 246) when they state that, “it
(would) be willing to sacrifice a short-run and immediate source of satisfaction
(12) Terentius’ “Homo sum: humani nil a me allienum puto” as a humanistic maxim for a
universal dedication —“Ad majorem Humanitatis gloriam”— passes inevitably through national
values. Refusing to acknowledge where you come from is an act of amputation. To be sure, there
are values beyond national ones. Nobody owns the air, at least for the time being; we all breathe
it. I claim that technology must be deeply rooted in national, and regional, developmental issues,
which do not deny international values. There is no regional, or international development aside
from a national one.
TECHNOETHICS 1099
for a longer-range one. An ideal-seeking system must be willing to sacrifice
the present for the future, because progress toward an ideal cannot take place
along a straight line”. One must remember different Gulags, different dicta-
tors, different prophets, different “ideals” and different “paradises”.
I submit that the present cannot and must not be mortgaged in the name
of future paradises, if only because such paradises do not exist at all. I claim,
on the contrary, that development is a process, an endless process where
public participation is essential. This does not deny the tasks of technogists in
such a process as has been emphasized throughout this work.
As early as 1948, Waddington wrote: “...The fundamental problem of
to-day lies far more in the sphere of ideals and values (...) than in the
technological. We already have all, or at least most, of the techniques we need
to provide a decent civilized life for everybody. They are not yet producing
that result (...) partly because the old political and economic machine was
unsuitable (...) We now have to decide for what purposes the new organisation
shall be designed. And to the discussion of these social ends, science has a
good deal more to contribute that has been recognized hitherto”. I would add
that although the “technique” we have are not perfect (Tobar-Arbulu 1986c)
they can indeed be used for “providing a decent civilized life for everybody”
provided “the old political and economic machine” is changed, not only at the
academic level —Eichner 1983, Thurow 1983— but in real, tangible, life (13).
Ackoff (1975) has insistently proposed “participative planning” as an alter-
native to measuring the quality of life. But participative planning by itself is
not a solution either. We need, at least as reference frames for contrast, some
kind of social indicators despide their limitations. By the time being, while we
are in need of better and deeper studies on the nature of man and his social
environment, we support the kind of list of social indicators proposed by the
OECD (see Tobar-Arbulu 1985e) (14).
(13) Does anybody in his right mind think that the less developed countries can afford their
huge external debt? Is it not necessary, more than ever, to renegotiate the debt burden carried by
less developed countries? This issue, however, will bring us beyond the scope of present work.
Further development of some of the present work is of particular interest, for example an analysis
of the problem of power, which is closely related to development. Third World countries have
been suffering for centuries from the chronic malaise of (political, economic, cultural, and
military) dependence. Any analysis of the problems confronting these countries which disregards
the problem of dependence, and its converse power, is merely self-serving academic chop-logic.
(On power see Russell 1938, Galbraith 1967-78; 1973-75, 1983b.)
(14) I would like to thank Julio Caro Baroja whose independent thinking and intelectual
honesty have influenced me for a long time.
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APPENDIX: THE TECHNOLOGIST’S HIPPOCRATIC OATH
I solemnly pledge myself to consecrate my skill to the service of humanity.
I will be loyal to muy profession and practice it in uprightness and honor;
whatever project I shall undertake, it shall be for the good of mankind to the
utmost of my power.
I will keep far aloof from wrong, corruption, and from tempting others to
vicious practice.
I will exercise my profession solely for the benefit of humanity and
perform no act for a criminal purpose, even if solicited, far less suggest it.
I will speak out against evil and unjust practice wheresoever I encounter it.
I will not permit considerations of religion, race, party policies, or social
standing to intervene between my duty and my work; even under threat.
I will not use my professional knowledge contrary to the laws of humanity.
I will endeavor to avoid waste and the depletion of non-renewable resources.
I make these promises solemnly, freely, and upon my honor.
(Adapted from Susskind 1973 p. 118).
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